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Abstract 
 
Natural threats have become more familiar, to the extent that requires ensuring the 
resilience of critical infrastructures. Critical infrastructures have always been 
complicated to study and assess, as they are all characterized by a collection of 
components that have numerous dependencies and interactions. Recently, several 
methods and frameworks have been put forward to assess and analyse 
comprehensively system's resilience. However, these methods have insufficiencies in 
identifying some hidden risks arising in a complex infrastructure. Therefore, it is 
essential to go beyond conventional methods and to develop risk strategies and 
decision-making techniques in order to overcome classical static assessment methods. 
This paper contributes to analyse the context of critical infrastructures with the 
ultimate objective of proposing new methods of choosing preventive maintenance 
strategies. It represents a modelling approach based on Petri nets to study the 
dynamic behaviour of the system when exposed to deterioration mechanisms and to 
support maintenance decision-making. The application is carried out on torrential 
checkdams in which the model results are presented and discussed in the paper. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Recently, societies have become more and more reliant on infrastructures which 
constitute a network of man-made systems that delivers permanently and 
cooperatively major benefits, supplies, and services (e.g. electric power, 
telecommunication, transportation, water supply). Infrastructures are important for 
enhancing social environment and for economic prosperity. However, the complexity 
and interdependency of these infrastructures have turned them into a critical system-
of-systems [1].  
 
Critical infrastructures (CIs) are usually exposed to various types of threats (technical, 
natural, man-made attacks, etc.) which cause them damage. Consequently, the 
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destruction or weakness of CIs may foster the risk due to the resulted impact on the 
economy, safety, and society as a whole [2]. Hence, analysing their reliability and 
safety but also choosing the best maintenance strategy is very essential. The internal 
or external interdependencies of CIs might also trigger risk such as the risk of 
cascading failures [3]. In other words, an initial failure of a CI which has 
dependencies with other CIs can result in disastrous proportions across the whole 
system. This reveals that interdependency increases the complexity of the system of 
CIs [4]. Nevertheless, not all infrastructures are considered to be critical. They can be 
classified based on a criticality scale which is identified after assessing the impact of 
the infrastructure disruption [5]. 
 
Another kind of CIs is linked to protection works against natural phenomena. 
Protection structures in the mountainous regions (e.g. Alpine) seek to fight against 
natural hazards generated in these areas. Torrents, avalanches, landslides, and other 
mountainous natural phenomenon are mostly caused by a gravitational and rapid 
movement of complex mixtures of fluids and solids [6]. According to the intensity of 
each natural phenomenon, several damages may arise. The impact can be expressed 
by the extent of the area that has been destructed, number of people affected, 
materials and assets disrupted (buildings, roads, infrastructures, etc.), financial 
damages, and the recovery rate of the resulted deterioration. 
 
Due to the fact that torrential protection works (checkdams, sedimentation dams, 
levees, etc.) aim in preventing or mitigating the risk and thus protect people and 
assets from the imposed danger resulting from the natural phenomena, deep attention 
has been given to them. Unfortunately, protection works age, deteriorate, and may be 
damaged overtime when exposed to hazards. Their deterioration will influence their 
level of performance and thus will affect the possibility of reducing risk as much as it 
should be reduced. Moreover, these structures are interdependent in which a failure of 
a certain component (one structure) of the system (series of protection works) can 
lead to the perturbation of other components within the same system. Also, certain 
type of failure in one component may trigger another type of failure in the same 
component. All of the previous aspects lead to the conclusion that protection works 
are complex structures and can be considered as CIs. Checkdams are the most used 
torrential protection works in France. They represent around 14,000 civil engineering 
protection works in the French state forests [7].   
 
To better understand the ability of protection structures in preventing damage, 
mitigating losses, and to be restored after an event requires mainly resilience analysis 
[8]. The term resilience refers to the ability of a system to withstand and adapt 
unfavourable events and its capacity to be recovered after being influenced due to 
such situations. Resilience analysis will give a comprehensive knowledge regarding 
the performance of these structures during and after the occurrence of hazards. 
Researchers have suggested several methods for quantifying resilience. Some 
researchers have concentrated on modelling the restoration of critical structures 
especially for bridge [9] and railway track [10] asset management hoping to improve 
their resilience.  
 
Due to the fact that the system can be repaired following different maintenance 
strategies, decision-aiding models can help to choose the most preferable strategy. 
Critical Services continuity, Resilience and Security 
 3 
These models analyse the behavior of the system over its lifetime period while being 
deteriorated or repaired. Such decision-aiding models can be implemented and 
assessed using Petri nets modelling tools and Monte Carlo simulation, which allow 
choosing between several maintenance strategies based on degraded-state conditions.  
 
This paper is organised as follows: Section 2 introduces the methodology used to 
implement the desired model; Section 3 presents the modelling approach which 
models the behaviour of the system from one state to another; Section 4 considers a 
case study applied on check dams after identifying the possible failure modes and 
maintenance strategies; Finally, section 5 provides results coming from the simulation 
of the model.  
 
 
2. Methodology Used: Stochastic Petri Nets (SPNs) 
 
Petri nets (PNs) are dynamic models used in modelling the behaviour of a system 
(e.g. failure, repair, etc.) and in dependability calculations [11]. They present a 
graphical and mathematical tool for modelling complex systems and their evolution 
over time. Carl Adam Petri was the German who invented the graphics and the rules 
of PNs in the 1962 to be used in automation systems [12]. PNs allow analysing the 
dynamic behaviour of the system by modelling the transitions between its different 
states. Following their invention, PNs were developed by going far from traditional 
analytical approaches and using Monte Carlo simulation instead. In addition, the use 
of stochastic transitions has proven its efficiency for dependability (reliability, 
availability, and maintainability) analysis and for system safety [13]. 
 
Recently, SPNs are used to model complex systems, mainly the deterioration of 
critical infrastructures, such as railway networks [14]. SPNs are particularly well 
suited to model the evolution of the system while changing from one state to another 
and are able to compute the time spent by the system in each state and the number of 
each type of intervention that was carried out based on Monte Carlo simulation [15]. 
They can therefore extend and complement existing methods providing static 
effectiveness assessment [16].  
  
PNs are a collection of four main elements. Places represent a condition and reflect 
the state of the system and are symbolized by circles. Transitions are symbolized by 
rectangles and correspond to events that cause a change of state in the system. The 
state of the system is characterized by marking places with tokens. Arcs are arrows 
that connect a place to a transition or a transition to a place only. They are associated 
with multiplicities which are responsible for the operation of the PN. If an arc does 
not indicate any multiplicity, the value will be one by default.  
 
Once the PN model is constructed and the lifetime period tf of the system is 
identified, Monte-Carlo simulation starts and the tokens will keep on moving around 
the model until tf  is reached. The movement of tokens is governed by the following 
rules: 
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1. When the number of tokens in each input place of a transition is at least equal to 
the multiplicity of the arcs connecting each, the transition is enabled and will be 
fired after a specified transition firing time.  
2. When a transition is fired, a number of tokens equal to the multiplicity of the 
arc is removed from the input places, and added to the output places.  
 
An additional characteristic of PNs is the inhibitor arc. This arc is represented by a 
dotted arrow and can be only directed from a place to a transition. Its aim is to inhibit 
the firing of the transition which it is connected to when its multiplicity is equal to the 
number of tokens located in its input place. 
 
 
 
   Figure 1: Simple PN showing the transition firing process. 
 
 
A simple PN is illustrated in Figure 1. P1 and P2 are both marked with a number of 
tokens satisfying the rule of enabling a transition. Therefore, T1 is enabled. After time 
t, T1 is fired in which 1 token (multiplicity = 1) is removed from P1, 2 tokens 
(multiplicity = 2) is removed from P2, and 1 token (multiplicity = 1) is added to the 
output place P3.    
    
 
3. SPN Modelling and Assessment Framework for a Deteriorating 
Structure 
 
In this section, a general modelling framework using SPN is presented. The aim is to 
represent the evolution of the state of a CI when exposed to degradation mechanisms 
or to maintenance operations and then to support decision-making by comparing 
different maintenance strategies.  
 
3.1 Degradation, inspection, and maintenance processes 
 
The modelling of the degradation process is illustrated in Figure 2 [17]. P1-P4 
represents the four degraded states which are linked by stochastic transitions T1-T3 
associated with exponential distribution firing times assumed and judged by an 
expert. In order to detect the state of the system, inspection must be carried out 
periodically. At t=0, a token is added to P1 (initial state) and to P5 waiting for T5 to 
fire so that the token moves to P6 where inspection takes place. In this study, 
inspection is scheduled every year. After the firing of one of the immediate transitions 
T6-T8, the condition of the system is revealed where a token appears in one of the 
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places P7-P9. In this case, the respective maintenance operation begins and after a 
specific time needed for reparation, T9, T10, or T11 fires depending on the condition 
revealed and the system returns back to its initial state waiting for another inspection. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. A basic PN model showing the degradation, inspection, and maintenance processes [17]. 
 
  
3.2 Decision-making support 
 
In order to make a decision and choose between the different possible maintenance 
operations, inhibitor arcs should be added to the model. The presence of a token in 
P10 or in P11 inhibits respectively maintenance operation 1 or maintenance operation 
2 from being carried out over the lifetime period of the system.  
 
After implementing each strategy, the results provided after Monte Carlo simulation 
reveals the time spent by the system in each state (sojourn time) and the number of 
maintenance operations performed within the lifetime period of the system. These 
outputs allow comparing between the different maintenance strategies in terms of 
time and cost. 
 
 
4. Application to Checkdams 
 
Checkdams, like any other protection structures, are constructed to perform certain 
functions.  Their major functions involve bed stabilization, bed elevation and slope 
reduction, retention of sediment deposits, flow centring, and prevention of 
longitudinal erosion. However, due to their age, wear and tear, and the intensity of the 
phenomenon that they must resist, different kinds of pathologies may appear affecting 
their performance level. The assessment of the efficacy of protection structures to 
reduce risk is based on three components: structural, functional, and economical 
efficacy [16]. To limit their degradation, these structures should be inspected and 
maintained regularly. Besides, in order to choose a suitable maintenance strategy, it is 
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important to have a comprehensive knowledge on the types of failures that 
checkdams may be subjected to.  
 
It is also essential to differentiate between functional and structural failures. This is 
due to the fact that the structure may be stable from a structural point of view but is 
not fulfilling a certain function. On the other hand, the structure may have some bad 
structural properties but is still fulfilling its functions.  Structural failures are linked to 
the external (e.g. sliding, overturning, etc.) and internal (e.g. reinforcement, material 
strength, etc.) stability of the structure.  Functional failures includes the phenomena 
of lateral bypass in which the dam is no more able to release the flow from its 
hydraulic section and the phenomena of scouring where intense clear water flow 
removes the soil under the base of the dam’s foundation.  
 
The present study aims to prove the ability of SPN models in choosing between 
different maintenance strategies to be applied on checkdams highlighting on some 
aspects such as time, cost, and efficiency. The application presented below aims to 
study the stability of a checkdam when exposed to scouring. Figure 3, represents the 
different possible functional (FS) and structural (SS) states of the dam depending on 
the increase level of scouring under the foundation.   
 
 
 
       Figure 3. State-degradation due to scouring under the foundation of a checkdam. 
      
       
In this paper, the functional and structural degradations are modelled separately 
without taking into account the dependencies and interactions between both failures.  
 
4.1 Evaluation of functional degradation states 
 
In this section, the SPN model describes the behaviour of the checkdam when 
exposed to functional failure. The different functional states are presented assuming 
that the system is stable from a structural point of view. Four stability states were 
defined as shown in Figure 4. Regarding maintenance operations: minor maintenance 
can be applied when the slight deterioration can be easily repaired (SS1, FS2), major 
maintenance is needed in order to repair the serious degradation level that the 
structure has reached (SS1, FS3), and corrective maintenance is required when the 
structure completely fails and should be replaced (SS1, FS4). 
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Thus the structural state is fixed to SS1 and four functional states are defined FS1, 
FS2, FS3, and FS4 corresponding to an increased level in scouring. When the system 
is not in its initial state, minor, major, or corrective (replacement) maintenance 
operations are to be carried out. 
 
In addition, the system can only be maintained by three minor operations and two 
major operations before replacing the system with a new one. This is illustrated by 
the presence of P12 and P13 (Figure 4) linked with inhibitor arcs with respective 
multiplicities 3 and 2. Meaning that when 3 tokens appear in P12, minor operations 
are inhibited and when 2 tokens appear in P13, major operations are inhibited. 
However, after each replacement, P12 and P13 should be emptied from tokens in 
order to enable again minor and major operations. This function is included within the 
properties of T11 (reset transition) in which upon firing, it removes all the tokens in 
P12 and P13. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. SPN model showing the functional degradation, inspection, and maintenance processes 
(improved and adapted version of [17]). 
 
 
The input data needed to run this model are the firing delay times associated with 
each transition. In this study, no historical data are available, therefore these data are 
assumed and assessed by experts in the field of checkdams and presented in Table I 
and Table II. 
 
Four different strategies are identified. In strategy 1, reparation is done as soon as the 
condition revealed after inspection does not correspond to the new state. In strategy 2, 
a token is added to P10 which inhibits minor operations. In strategy 3, a token is 
added to P11, thus major operations are inhibited. In strategy 4, P10 and P11 are 
marked with tokens meaning that only corrective maintenance can be carried out. 
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4.1 Evaluation of structural degradation states 
 
In this section, the SPN model describes the behaviour of the checkdam when 
exposed to structural failure. The different structural states are presented assuming 
that the system is fixed to a functional state FS3 where scouring already exists. Four 
structural states are defined SS1, SS2, SS3, and SS4. The structural state of the dam 
degrades in which the dam will start to tilt until it finally overturns when scouring 
reaches a critical level. Scouring level can be used as an indicator to describe the 
behaviour of the checkdam from structural point of view. The four different stability 
states are represented in Figure 5. 
 
 
 
Figure 5. SPN model showing the structural degradation, inspection, and maintenance processes    
(improved and adapted version of [17]). 
 
 
Regarding maintenance operations: major maintenance can be applied by reinforcing 
the checkdam to avoid its failure by overturning after reaching state (SS3, FS3) and 
corrective maintenance is required when the structure completely fails and should be 
replaced (SS4, FS3). In state (SS2, FS3), the checkdam is subjected to mild tilting in 
which no need for a maintenance operation to be carried out at this stage. Moreover, 
Figure 5 reveals that only two major operations can be carried out before the 
Transition 
Exponential Failure rate λ 
(years
-1
) 
T1 0.5 
T2 0.1 
T3 0.033 
Table I: Failure rates of degraded-states 
transitions. 
Transition Firing time (years) 
T4 T6 T7 T8 0 
T5 1 
T9 0.013 
T10 0.022 
T11 0.041 
Table II: Constant transitions firing times. 
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replacement of the system. The firing delay times corresponding to structural 
deterioration are estimated by an expert and given in Table III and Table IV. 
 
 
Table III: Failure rates of degraded-states 
transitions. 
Transition 
Exponential Failure rate λ 
(years
-1
) 
T1 0.5 
T2 0.25 
T3 0.5 
Table IV: Constant transitions firing times. 
Transition Firing time (years) 
T4 T7 T8 0 
T5 1 
T10 0.082 
T11 0.33 
 
 
For structural degradation, two maintenance strategies are suggested. In strategy 1, 
reparation is done when the system reaches state (SS3, FS3). In strategy 2, P11 is 
marked with a token in which only corrective maintenance can be carried out. 
 
 
5. Results 
 
The SPN models are constructed using GRIF-Workshop developed by TOTAL. The 
simulation of the previous models is based on Monte-Carlo simulation. After each 
simulation, the mean sojourn time in each state and the number of maintenance 
operations carried out during the lifetime period of the system will be given. The 
model is simulated over a period of 100 years. It is noticed that convergence in results 
occurs after 200 simulations.  Tables V - VIII provide all the results obtained after the 
simulation of the different strategies applied for functional and structural degradation 
over a period of 100 years.  
 
Table VI reveals the effect of each maintenance strategy on the mean sojourn time. It 
is noticed that the longest sojourn time in the initial state (21 years) occurs by 
performing strategy 1. This is due to the fact that the system is repaired as soon as it 
degrades further from the initial state. For strategy 2, minor operations are inhibited, 
thus the system will remain in a degraded state for a long time. This is the reason 
behind the decrease in the sojourn time in the initial state (11 years) when applying 
strategy 2. 
 
 
     Table V: Average expected number of interventions - functional degradation. 
Strategy Minor Maintenance Major Maintenance Corrective Maintenance 
1 6 3 1 
2 0 4 1 
3 7 0 2 
4 0 0 3 
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     Table VI: Average expected sojourn time (years) – functional degradation. 
Strategy (SS1, FS1) (SS1, FS2) (SS1, FS3) (SS1, FS4) 
1 21 46 32 0 
2 11 53 35 1 
3 20 24 55 1 
4 6 28 65 1 
 
 
     Table VII: Average expected number of interventions – structural degradation. 
Strategy Major Maintenance Corrective Maintenance 
1 8 5 
2 0 11 
 
 
     Table VIII: Average expected sojourn time (years) – structural degradation. 
Strategy (SS1, FS3) (SS2, FS3) (SS3, FS3) (SS4, FS3) 
1 30 56 11 2 
2 25 46 22 6 
 
 
In Table VIII, it is also clear that when major maintenance is inhibited, the sojourn 
time of the system in the initial state (SS1, FS3) will be less than that when 
maintenance is applied directly if the system degrades to state (SS3, FS3). The results 
obtained in Table V and Table VII, allow comparing the different strategies in terms 
of cost. It is assumed that for functional degradation, the cost of minor maintenance, 
major maintenance and corrective maintenance are 5 000 €, 15 000 €, and 45 000 € 
respectively. For structural degradation, it is assumed that the cost of major 
maintenance and corrective maintenance are 60 000 € and 150 000 € respectively. 
 
Knowing the cost of each type of operation and using the data in Table V and Table 
VII, the total cost of each strategy can be computed. The results are given in Table IX 
and Table X. It can be seen that for functional degradation, strategy 4 is the most 
expensive because of the huge number of corrective maintenance to be done (3 
replacements). Strategy 2 has the lowest cost since the system is allowed to 
deteriorate before being maintained with minor operations.  
 
 
Table IX: Total maintenance cost (€) for each strategy – functional degradation. 
Strategy Minor Maintenance Major Maintenance Corrective Maintenance Total Cost 
1 30 000 45 000 45 000 120 000 
2 0 60 000 45 000 105 000 
3 35 000 0 90 000 125 000 
4 0  0 135 000 135 000 
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Table X: Total maintenance cost (€) for each strategy – structural degradation. 
Strategy Major Maintenance Corrective Maintenance Total Cost 
1 480 000 750 000 1 230 000 
2 0 1 650 000 1 650 000 
 
 
Similarly, for structural degradation, strategy 2 is more expensive than strategy 1 due 
to the large number of corrective maintenance operations. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
 This paper addresses the development of a decision-aiding method regarding 
resilience and maintenance of CIs. The main objective is to go beyond traditional 
safety and reliability techniques for efficacy and resilience assessment. Based on the 
results, SPN approach, combining Monte Carlo simulation and state-based modelling 
technique has proved to be favourable and can be an appropriate tool to be used later 
for 1) analysing the interdependencies among CIs and 2) choosing the best operating 
strategies. The limitations in this study include modelling the system without taking 
into account the dynamic interactions between the different failure modes that may 
occur on the structure and how an event may foster the occurrence of another event 
(accident sequence). Calculations are based on expert assumptions and further works 
are needed to improve and determine modelling hypothesis (e.g. failure rates). 
Furthermore, acquiring reliable results in the domain of resilience and preventive 
maintenance is not easy due to a number of barriers such as information imperfection 
and the absence of real historical data. This study will be developed by taking into 
consideration interdependencies which increase the risk of failure. The strong reliance 
on CIs points out that it is a priority to assure their safety and availability. 
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